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In the past sixteen years, the Soviet Un ion has modernized its
agricultural systeinby expanding its technology.and changing its inode of
production.

From a position of low rank and priority, agriculture has

raised its status and. its claims on capital investment • . Tractors have
become ubiquitous, the wheat belt has shifted 200 miles· northward, and in
R & D agriculturalists,. the Soviet Union outnumbers the United. States.
Even the prospects for changing the course of whole rivers so that. they
flow south now seems more feasible.
Yet Soviet agriculture continues to be criticized for inefficiency.
In part, this conclusion is based on old data, for their output growth
exceeds ours~

ln part, it represents a prici~g problem, for their food

is highly subsidized {as Vl'ad Treml has show,), and subsidies
'1
create queues.
Wh i 1e the output has grown, the costs have grown faster

whi re

prices have been relatively stable.

c i ency in di st r i but ion or cons umi, ti on but

The queues reflect ineffinot necessai ly in production.

Nevertheless, the reputation ·persists and this.paper examines its authentication.
The charges of Soviet agricultural inefficiency are built from
comparisons between countries of growth rates, yields, and so on.
wel 1 known, the base of a comparison can serve a purpose.

As is

This need not

be a devious or·suspect act but merely reflect the clients of the comparison.
Thus most comparisons of Soviet agriculture have focused on the United States
as a referent because this is an eminently legitimate concern of the clients,
our Congress.

Nevertheless the Soviet Union 1 s agriculture has been modern-

izing rapidly and ought also to be compared to other modernizing agricultures not only for a measure of its success but for its modernizing stri3tegy,

2

ot socialist structural transformation.
Transforming an agricultural structure implies more production
efficiency, or increasing-farm output from existing inputs ..

This inter-

pertation is too narrow because most output really is increased by
augmenting the existing inputs by modern manufactured ones.

Although the

farm does not produce these new inputs, as it did the old ones, it is
often cred rted with· the en·han ced output that comes f rotn the.

A formu 1at ion

that takes into account these.relationships of the complements aild substitutes
for basic ·inputs is the production function:
and land, and the

new inputs

The basicfn,puts_ are labor

are mechanical, chemical and biological

technology.
A production function may seem an odd statistical tool to apply to

.

the Soviet Union.

2

It is incontestably a phenomenon of neoclassical

economics, relying on assumptions of equilibrium,-and profl"t maximization
that seem chimerical· in _the 1 ight of Soviet experience.

It considers

· nothing at al 1 about the 1evel or composition of demand, focusing instead
on the components of aggregate supply.

At its simplest level, a production

function may be an empty formal ism expressing only the intuitively· obvious
faat that agricultural output cannot be increased without more inputs and
the both-should be fully measured.

Extended to_ the Soviet experience, it

_would predict that agricultural production will decrease if livestock are
destroyed (a·s during collectivization) or that it will increase if fertilizer·
deliveries grow (as·_during the.recent decade).
Nevertheless, the available production function studies also have a
certain intui"tive plausibility that commends them.

First of all, they

express a purely technical or engineering relationship and a willingness
to separate the that aspect of efficiency from the economic.

Second, they

3.
are generalized and have been applied to the study of agri_cul~ure in _a
diversity of economic systems; thus the Soviet estimates can be compared
to otherso 3 Finally they classify our knowle_dge in a way that _is fairly
independent of_ ideology.·

If the first approximation to an efficiency study

of Soviet agriculture is purely technical and independent of ideology, e.g.,
the nationalization of land, then the second approximation that includes it
can more accurately separatethe pure effects of public land ownership.The production function is particularly appropriate
system whose prices are known to be in disequilibrium.
level of est1m~tion, this data is not required.

for studying a
At the simplest

I will stay at this level

and rely in this essay on my est·imates that have-been.published elsewhere,
along with some extensions.

4

This is hot to deny that the more complex

production functions are useful, for they are.

They more clearly incorporate

the assumption of optimization and the principle of duality.

Michael Wyzan

has worked with them and I hope that he will pursue that path. 5
The distinction that I make is between technica.1.· {or engineering)
efficiency and economic efficiency~

In graphic terms, this is the difference

between being on an i soquant and being at a tangency of an i soquant· and an
isocost line.

Yet economics is not all tangencies and intersections.

is in addition the ephemeral componet known as

11

There

system 11 or "organization, 11

which includes income distribution and motivational incentives.

In my work

on production functions I have explored ra_ther deeply the 1 iterature on.
agricultural development ih less developed economies and will link that
information to production function estimation.

This is a departure from past

practice, where agriculture most often has been compared between the Soviet
Union and the United States.

Here the Soviet Union's production efficiency

is seen primarily a~ a focal point for today's developing countries who find

4.
socialized agriculture-to be alluring.

6

Many of our wel 1-known judgements about socialized agriculture aremore accurately described·as testable hypotheses that are subject to
empirical verification.

The production function formulates the test and

def in.es their boundaries so that they are reasonable in both economic
logic and technologi_cal-particulars.

Although socialized agriculture

probably is attractive because of its effects on income distribution-, it
also has efficiency consequences,- -which the production function tests.
Two questions of Soviet agricultural efficiency are examined here:

the

relative resource base, or proportions of.factors of production, e.g., labor
and land; and the optimal scale.

Although these are related to questions

of factor incentives and ·income distribution, those are more or less ignored.
An advantage of tl:ie production function is its multi.dimensionality;·
when the inputs and outputs are many.

For example, consider the off-cited.

conclusion that the private plots in Soviet agriculture are more efficient
because they p reduce 23 percent of the nat(~on I s food on ori 1y 3 percent of .
its land}

A simple production function tells us that output depends on

both labor and land. -The private plots are more precisely described as
labor-using and yield-increasing.

They conserve on land, the resource in

shortest supply, but use generously the more available resource which is
labor.-

Their greater effectiveness is the sum of "the high yield from land,

· the intensfve_ use of labor, and the specialization in land-saving, laborusing products such as meat and vegetables.
This view of the private plots .uses ar,

argument of comparative

advantage-that is most often found in international trade theory~

Its

extensions shed some light on the critical differences between the private
and socialized ownership- of agricultural land.

A first extension is that

s.
the two sectors di ff_er less in ownership than in factor pr_opo_rtions.
the assumptions of- trade theory are met, there wi 11 over time be

a

If

tend-ency

toward a factor-and commodity-price equalization. between the sectors even
without factor mobility, i.e., the transfer of socialized land to private.
use.,

This occurs primariTy through produ-ct speciali"zation.
A second extension of trade theory- is that the specialization of the

sectors depends on their factor .proportions, or the land per worker.

In

this light, the_ ~rfvate plots ~an be more critically\~iewed as a residual
employer for surplus l~bor as yet unabsorbed into the more ind~strialized
economy.

8

There is some support for this view in the Soviet data.

First,

the recent relaxation of restrictions on private production have not
appreciably increased output.

Overall the pool of agricultural labor has

shrunk and the output on private plots has declined.

Nevertheless, in

the republics where the pool of agricultural labor has increased, the· private
plot production also has grown, e.g., in Azerbaidzhan, where private_ plot
output increased by 43 percent between 1970 and 1979. 9 . Thus, holding -farm
labor on the private plots (or by a domestic _passport system or other control)
is a policy that is labor-using and job-creat~ng~lO.
This argument does not deny that prilvate plot production meets a
.

-

-

necessary demand but focuses instead on fts comparative ad~antage, where
the trad ing-p rodi.J cin g uni ts with di ff ere~ t resource e_ndowmen ts are not
nations but sectors.

Although the need to mobilize surplus labor is

appropriate for a static, developing economy where workers are in· surplu·s,
it disappears when opportunities are available in a modern sector.

Further,

no labor force rejects an augmentation of its musclepower and a release
from backbreakirrn work.

Capital-using production,·either in agriculture

or manufacturing, is an attra~tive alternative.

Nevertheless, many

developing countries falter in privately suppl.ying and allocating capital

I

_I

6.
and rely on public finance of investment and forced saving_.

~istorical ly

and politically the Soviet Uni~n linked agricultu~al capital formation ~o
land natio.na.lization and collectivization.

11

This combfoat,ion of a land reform (the n(ational ization) a new economic
organization (the collective), and the public S:ypply of capital has attracted
the developing economies.

12

These countries have sought to modernize food

p rodu cti on but face ad i 1emma between that goa 1 and po 1 it i ca 1 stab i I i ty
because capital allocations are-most effective on .the largest farms.
attractiveness stems from several sources:

Th.is

they are diversified so their

riskiness i,s less; they can generate savings from consumption to repay
credit; they often have the politi.cal clout-that passes for.eligibility. 13
More important yet, the costs of public administration are lower when supplying
a few large farms than when·,supplying niany smal 1 farms.

·

·.

In short, the large

·

14

farm,s have scale advantages. for farmers and bureaucrats, alike. .

Their

drawback .is that they enhance the existing income inequalities and favor the
rich.· The Soviet model that enlarges farm size-and modernizes technology
but avoids the income distribution consequences of private land ownership
is appealing.to.economies that are concerned with both equity and .efficiency.
· The introduction of capital as a third'factor of production expands a
· production function to considerations of scale, optimal farm size, and the
use of manufactured inputs.

T~~

Soviet farms have been criticized for being

too-large,and_ therefore inefficient~

Our ability to.evaluate this argument

is somewhat ambivalent. - on·one hand;

a production

ideal for this purpose.

function analysis seems

Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, the input

coefficients should sum to one if the returns to scale are constant (and.· the farm size· is optimal).
is tndeed appropriate.

Such a finding would indicat;e that today's scale

My production function estimate~ led to such·a
i
1

1
con c 1u s i on , but· on 1y ten tat i ve 1y. 5
On the other hand~ optima 1 farm size wi, 11 differ between re.publics
.

'

.

on the basis of factor proportions and product specialization~

While the

private and socialized sectors can be compared on these tharacterist,ics,
the collective and state farms are not so sharply contrased.

Their factor

proportfons are known (and .shown in Table 2 below), but their specializations
differ ,by r~publ i"c and require a more extensive analysis than this paper
allows.;

This gap in our knowledge-of Soviet agriculture 'is significant and

deservi;ng of remedy.
1

Th ere is yet another problem •. My production funct·ion considered ·only
those .Lnputs:used directly. on the farm, but·as agr.iculture is modernized
the 1 ine between ouiputs_ and inputs that are
'

Thus t~e

11

11

farm 11 or "off-farm wi 11 change.

off-farm 11 inputs to Soviet agriculture include not only the

plariner:s but .the hydrolo!]ist in the Ministry of Water Supply, the research
scientist in a seed institute, the chemist in the fertili.zer industry and·
the me~han ic in a repair faci 1 ity" of Sel 1 khoztekhn ika.

Incorporating the

effect$ of this infrasturcture is at best .incomplete.
One off-farm input of· considerable _importance to developin_g agriculture
is thelpubl ic investment in people, such as. the human capital in education.

16

·,

By ignorance or malice, an
modern: inputs.

uneducated and unskilled worker can waste many

For example,, the gen·etical ly advanced seeds are more

'

produ~.tive only with the proper fertilization in accurately measured amounts.
j.

Human :capital' in education affects a production function estimate_ in two ways.
The fi,rst is its own-effect, where educated workers are more productive than
poorly ed1:1cated .workers.

This effect is surprisingly absent in IJlY production

fun ct i:on estimates.·
.

.

1he second effect is the complementarity of education with manufactured

8.
inputs.

17

In the Soviet estimates, th.is effect is so stro:,g
that
it causes ·
.
"

data collinearity; either the manufactured inputs or the-human capital -is
statistically redundant.

It further is two-directional; a Soviet. Study

offnorthwestern farms indicates that new _capital equipment incr.eases output
not at a 11 where the 1abor force is more than 92 percent un ski 11 ed or il 1•

.

. 18

educated.· . Education seems further correlated even with the location of
new ferti 1 izer manufacturing plants. 19

A first approximation to answering.

the question of optimal farm size again examines the regional variation ·in·
factor proportions.

The progenitors of this perspective,Vernon Ruttan and.

Yujiro Hayami, classify the world's agricultural systems into land-saving

-

.

.

- 20 .

(such as Japan) and labor-saving (such as the United States).

. Each class

conserves on the resource in shortest supply, even directing its technology

-

toward that goal.

21

The republics of the Soviet Union differ considerably

in thei.r agricultural land-labor ratios. · r-;1e .~ata are shown in Table 1,
where the repu~ U cs are grouped by the i.r ratios of hectares per worker.
(The second number indicates the share of arable land in production and will
be d.i scussed below.)

Table l :

Land per worker (Z/L) and Land utilization (ZiAr), in
Sov_iet agriculture, by republics, 1979

Group
Z/L

Z/Ar

12

.57

Kazakhstan 22

.19

RSFSR

Group 11 1

Group· 11

Z/L

.Z/Ar

Z/L

Z/Ar

Ukraine

6

.80

Georgi a

.1

• 24

Be 1oruss i'a

5

.66

Azerbaidzhan 2

.31

Moldavia

3

.71

Armen i.a

2

.33

Lithuania

7

• 66

Uzbekistan -

2

.15

Latvia

7

.67

Kirghizic:1

3 · .13

Estonia

8

• 64

Tadj ik i stan _ 2

• 19

Tu rkmen i s tan 2.5 .03

9.
Definitions:

( 1') · Z:

sowi hectares of crop 1and;

(2) L:

annual number of workers tak.ing par·t in state farm
or collective farm labor;

(3) Ar: hectares of arable land.

Source:

Narodnoe Khoziaistvo v 1979 g.·,
TsSU, Moscow:

121; 290, 304; 240

Using this framework, the republics of the .Sovie Un ion may be grouped
by their factor proportions and compared for the appropriate technology
that would conserve their scarcer resource.

The republics of Group I {in

Table l) possess.an agricultural resource endowment that resembles the United
States; thei.r appropriate technology would be labor-saving (and land-us.ing).
In Group Ill, the endowment resembles that of.Japan and its appropriate
technology would be land-saving, labor-using, and yield-increasing.
analog is the.private sector as discussed earlier.)

(Its

Therepublics in Group

II are intermediate to the others in factor endowment and in the appropriate
direction of their technology.
The Soviet republics indeed differ in their ·growth strategies by
resou.rce endowment.

The relative land avai labi 1 i ty {the Z/L of Table I)

is negatively correlated with yield (r = -0.65) and positively corr,elated
.

'

with labor productivity (r = +0.42).

(Both correlation coefficients are

si"gnificant,: in·that .the probability that either equals zero is only 0.0001,
but this is due to the partial identity.}

At polar extremes, the republic

of Georgia has adopted a land-saving strategy of agricultural development.
The RFSFR has adopted a labo.r-saving strategy.
. 22
have .u~ed a mixed strategy~

The republics of Group 11

Optimal farm size also is related· to regional resource endowment and
factor proportions.

Berry and Cline, in a world-wide study of developing

agricultural systems, show that a larger farm size is associated·with a
higher labor productivity "and a lower land productivity (yield), as the-se
farmes replace labor by capital and hold more land out of use. 23

Applying

the results of this study to the Soviet Union, the farm size would be
larger in the north than in the south because of the different .land-worker·
ratios.

These data are show, in Table 2, which indicates that the Soviet

Union:follows t.his common pattern:

the farm size is larQer where land is

relatively more available.·overall, of course, th.e average .Soviet farm is
''

extremely large; Berry-Cline found a predominance of large farms. (over 1000
hectares) only in Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil.

Nevertheless, the relative

So.vi et farm s i.ze reflects factor endownen ts ..
The Berry-Cline relationship has two corollaries that are relevant
to Soviet agriculture.

The first is that more land will be held out of

use whe·re available land is greater, but this result does not hold for, the
Soviet Un·ion.

As Table 1 ·indicates, there is more· unused land in the

south. This disparity reflects the south's need for irrigation.

A second

corollary is that small farm (private plot) production is more appropriate
'

in the south where the land per worker is ,low, where labor is in
a.rid where it can be applied intensively.

11

'

surplus, 11

This is partially .confirmed by

Soviet experience; in the north ( Group I), the. share of agr i cu 1 tu ra 1 Jan d
in .Private use is less than 3 percent but in the s_outh (Group Ill) it is
greater than 6 percent.

However; the greatest. share·is in the.west (Group

11) ·where 7 percent is held in.Private use on the collective farms and 10
percent-by worker-:employees, usually from the state farm.
The discussion thus far indicates that the Soviet union has not one but
three agricultural production systems, differentiated on the basis of factor
proportions and other relevant characteristics.

In addition, some previous

11 •

work of mine indicates a strong Soviet preferen.ce for reg_iona_l self-suffici.-_
ency .in food production, indicating autonomy of demand, and Ken Gray has
rationalized these preferences· by observing the transport·minimizing bias
(n agricultural planning.

24

· Thus a production function was estimated for

each of the three regions, for the eleven years (1965-75) and this result
compared to a national, estimate.
Q1: =

The estimation equation in each case was:

A+ b Z* + b HP*+ b FERTR* + b LABOR* + b HERDS + e,~here(*)
1
2
3 ·
.4 5

indicates a logarithm, Q is the value of putput in" 1965 prices, Z i.s sown
hectares, HP is capital measured· in horsepower capacity, FERTR is delivered
fertilizer

in

100 percent nutrient units, LABOR is the annual participation

in state and collective farms. and HERDS is the productive livestock
inventory measured in cattle-equivalent units.·
. The precision of the production function estimates, as shown by a Chow
test, is significantly enchanced.

25

Nevertheless 1 some of the coefficients

do not significantly differ from zero, including all of those for KazakhstanRFSFR.

Several .explanations are possible • . First; the model may be mis-

specified including omitted variables.

This is discussed

below and implies

that a more sophisticated model such as that of Don Green is appropriate for

.

, 26

· this region.

Second, it indicates that the RFSFR is comprised of more

than a single group and should be subdivided as data become available.
Finally, it may indicate that these inputs are not as productive in this
region as in others and that the policy of regional autonomy is-not efficient
in production.- This can be seen from the output elasticities.

Since the

estimation is in .logarithms, its coefficients indicate an output elasticity
for each input in each region, e.g., the input coefficient of .23 for land
in the west

indicate.s that a 10 percent increase 'in land would increase

output there by 2.3 percent.

A coeffi'c:ient that i's not·si,gnificantly different

12.

from zero indicates that these inputs at the margin have·l ittle if any
effect on output~The consequences of an omitted input for the estimation depend on the
optimization assumptions, or the behavioral model; behind the equation.
This point can be i 1 lustrated by the input of water from rainfall and from
irrigation.

If an input quantity cannot be foreseen except for assuming

that it will equaL a constant

(most likely the mean), then the optimizer-·

decision-maker has no special knowledge to use in deciding the quantity
of the input to use.

An example is the water from rainfall" where the

quantity is Variable but unknown.

However, if an input can be forecast

and its quantity chosen :to reflect this knowledge, the estimated coefficients·
·are biased measures w~en the input is.omitted from the equation •. An example
is irrigated or drained land, where the quantity can be forecast-.

Un-

fortunately the ·ability to include this variable in these equations is beyond
the scope of this paper •. In particular, as much as
Jarid in some republics is in private use.

49

percent of irrigated

Since the other inputs in this

sector, particularly labor, are not known, the da.ta for incorporating
irrigated· land in the estimating equation now are inadequate.
This paper has examined the different resource endowments of the
republics of the USSR with their variable factor proportions.

The focus

of this work was the different paths to agricultural modernization that
each eridownent requires.
. saving modernization.

These can be divided into labor-saving and land-

The Soviet Union then was divided into three

agricultural regions whose resource endownents are roughly similar within
the region but different between the regions.

Production functions, Cobb~

Doub las 1 inear in logarithms; were then estimated for these three region so
Two otf the regions, the south and the west, were-found to have relatively

13.
well-behaved product<~on functions comparable to those in other agricu-1tura1
systems;.

These are the regions with rapid growtho• However,- the produdion

I

function for the dominant agricultural region, including Kazakhstan and
the RFSFR; were not well-behaved and require further sub-divisons on" the
basis of resource endownents~ 27
This regional approach to production analysis in the Soviet Union
suggests a number of fruitful steps for further analysis.,

First is an

examination of the factor-augmenting technology according-to the regional
resource endowments.

In particular, some work elsewhere has found that

technology augments the scarcer resources in response to price incentives,
usuaJ-ly with a lag of 7-8 years, e.g.

where the price of labor ~s relatively

high, 'the technology tends to be labor-saving.

The USSR, with its land

nationalization and economic planning, has no similar price incentives, but
should fo1lowsimi1)ar strategies for its technology.

Its ability.is of

considerable interest. Second, this paper suggests. that regional special.

.

.

ization of o~tput can supplement the differences in factor endowments
and eventually equalize factor incomes.

The USSR has a long-standing

commitment to national equality in labor income, to which regional
specializations could contribute~

Thus far, specialization has been

pursued only because of climate; but it has considerabl~ prospects for
growth.

14.
Table 2:

Land per worker (Z/L)' and Average farm size (ZIN) in Soviet
agriculture, by collective and state farms, by r-epublics, 1979

Group I (north)

Group JI (west)

Group 111 (south)

Collective farms (kolkhozy):

.ZJL_
1,RSFSR
Kazakhstan

Z/N

11

4,700

15

10 ~800

Z/L

Georgia

Belorussia

4

2000

Azerbaidzhan

3

1200

2

2400

Armenia

2

500

6

1900

,':Uzbekistan

1. 5

1700

7

2600

Kirghizia

3

3200

8

2900

Tadj iki stan

2

2400

Turkmenistan

2

2300

Esten i a

State farms .( sovkhozy): ·
Z/L
Z/N

Kazakhstan

23

15,000

400

3400

* · tatvia:

-5,500

Z/N

5

Lithuania

11

2/L

Ukraine

*Moldavia

.':RSFSR

Z/N

Z/L ·

. Z/L

Z/N

2/N

700

5

3400

Georgia

r,se 1oru ss i a

5

2400

Azerba i dzhan

2

·. 700

Moldavia

2

1300

Armenia

2

600

Lithuania

5

2000

Uzbekistan

3

2700

6

2900

Tadjikistan

2

2600.

7

· 3100

2.5

1500

Ukraine

1·Latvia
Estonfa

·'•Turkmenistan ·

Definitions:

(1) Z: sown hectares of crop land;
(2) L:

annual number of workers taking part in
state farm or co 11 ect i ve farm .1 abor;

(3) N:

number of collective or state farms at
the end of. the year.

r:

Medi an

Source: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo v 1979 g.
Ts!:>u, Moscow: 290-1, 302-4, 240

I
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Table 3:

Production function estimates, Soviet Union. 1965_-75_,
national and regional

Land
bl

HP
. b2

FERT 1 R
b3

.28

,.03+

North ( Group I' N=22)

-.45+

-.52+

West (Group 11, _N=66)

• 23

.32

National (N=165)

South ( Group I I I, N=77)

-.oo+

.04+

LABOR
b4

HERDS
b5

.27

• 34

.06+

• 30+

.19+

1.18+

-.oo+

.27

.13+

.35

.30

.33

+: Coefficient does not significantly
differ form zero
2
R == .99 in al 1 estimates
Sources:
(1) Land: sown area (Z); see Table 1.
(2) HP, FERTILIZER, HERDS, See sources and inethodology }n Clayton, 1-980
Herds are an aggregation of cattle, swine, sheep, goats and poultry
in cattl e-equ i val ent uni ts.
(3) Labor:

See Table 1.

i

i
'I

I
II
I
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A production function is the statistical relationship between output
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